| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Large pastes are split into 8 KiB chunks on the client side,
each stored separately in a dedicated chunks/ directory.
A version-2 manifest paste lists the chunk hashes and is
announced to the DHT; chunks replicate via periodic republish
with per-put throttling to avoid rate-limit bans.
- New PUTC/PUTM protocol commands for chunks and manifests
- Client-side chunking avoids O(n^2) base58 on large content
- HTTP handler reassembles chunks directly from store
- DHT sync routes incoming chunks to chunks/ directory
- Republish interval reduced to 5 min with 200ms throttle
- tp.1 updated with new 1.44 MB limit
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- Block marker on delete prevents DHT re-import
- Remote delete propagation via delete_callback
- New index page with project info and man page links
- Fix lookups status order (started/completed)
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When the routing table drops to zero peers, the daemon now
re-joins bootstrap nodes every 60s, unbanning their addresses
first so replies are not silently discarded.
Both tp and tpd accept -v for debug-level output without
needing RUST_LOG environment variable.
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- tp: limit stdin to 64 KiB + 1 byte to reject oversized pastes
early without unbounded memory allocation
- daemon: bound the oversized-line drain to MAX_LINE_SIZE so a
client without newlines cannot block beyond the read timeout
- tpd: document intentional Arc::into_raw leak in signal handler
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- Write identity.key with mode 0600 to prevent other users from
reading the Ed25519 private seed
- Use destination filename in atomic_write temp path to avoid
collisions between concurrent writes to different files
- Reject HTTP methods other than GET/HEAD with 405
- Return "Hello Tesseras World" on GET /
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Warn when set_nonblocking or set_read_timeout fails instead of
silently disconnecting the client.
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A slow connection or DHT lookup (up to 30s) no longer blocks
the entire HTTP accept loop. Connections beyond the limit get
a 503 response.
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- Atomic writes in store (write-to-temp + rename) to prevent
corruption on crash
- Validate DHT results against requested content hash to reject
forged data from malicious nodes
- Limit protocol line size to 128 KiB on Unix socket to prevent
memory exhaustion
- Use saturating_add for TTL expiry to prevent u64 overflow
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DHT-backed encrypted pastebin with two binaries (tp/tpd),
XChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption, content-addressed storage,
and Unix socket + HTTP interfaces.
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